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ABSTRACT OF FACTS 
In January of 2006, James and Glenna Blittersdorfwere current on their monthly lease 
payment of $1,800.00 for a Forklift leased in 2004. Blittersdorf s purchased a bucket for the 
forklift in 2004 from a third party. 
In January 2006, the lessor, Lund Machinery, persuaded the Blittersdorfs to purchase the 
equipment, specifically, with the guarantee that there would be no requirement of a down 
payment; however, the $22,000 (65%) worth oflease payments would be applied toward the 
purchase price. Lund Machinery convinced Mr. and Mrs. Blittersdorf to allow the lull bucket to 
be added to the list of equipment being purchased to avoid any security deposit. The monthly 
purchase payment was to be $1,407.00, with the first payment due April 20, 2006- followed by a 
10 day grace period. Lund Machinery located and engaged a lender (Triad Leasing and 
Financial Inc.) who financed the transaction. 
On the 11 th of April, the lender accelerated the payment of the loan and demanded 
payment of$92,701.00. The equipment was immediately repossessed and sold, resulting in a 
deficiency judgment of $72,334.00. This bizarre chronicle transpired in less than three months. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
James and Glenna Blittersdorf are small business owners in Alpine, Wyoming. Their 
company is Rocky Mountain Rogues (collectively referred to hereafter as Rocky Mountain). In 
June of 2003, Rocky Mountain entered into a lease agreement on a forklift with Lund Machinery 
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(hereinafter Lund). This lease agreement included a provision to apply a percentage of the lease 
payments toward the purchase price of the forklift, should Rocky Mountain wish to purchase it in 
the future. In order to enter into the lease agreement, Rocky Mountain was required by Lund to 
make a security deposit of$5,000.00 It was agreed that Rocky Mountain would provide Lund 
with the security deposit check, with the understanding that the check would be held, uncashed. 
This check was in fact held in Rocky Mountain's client file at Lund and remains uncashed. 
In February 2004, Keith Webb, a Lund employee, approached Rocky Mountain regarding 
a 1.5 yard Lull bucket he had for sale that could be used with the forklift being leased. Rocky 
Mountain purchased this bucket offered by Mr. Webb by providing a check payable to a third 
party. The bucket was delivered to Rocky Mountain, who proceeded to use it with the leased 
forklift. 
In January 2006, after two years ofleasing the forklift, Mr. Webb again approached 
Rocky Mountain and discussed the conversion of the lease agreement to a sales agreement, in 
regards to the forklift. Mr. Webb indicated that a credit in the amount of$22,314.32 (the 
percentage agreed to in the lease agreement) would be applied to the purchase price. Rocky 
Mountain expressed an interest in this offer, but, with the understanding that it would not require 
the payment of any upfront funds by Rocky Mountain. Rocky Mountain was going through an 
expensive refinancing and did not have funds available for this type of expense. Mr. Webb 
assured them that the $22,314.32 lease payment credit on the purchase price of the equipment, 
would be more than enough to cover any security deposit or down payment that might be 
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required, therefore avoiding the requirement additional deposit money. Based upon this 
representation, Rocky Mountain decided to accept the offer from Lund to convert the lease to a 
lease/purchase. 
Mr. Webb informed Rocky Mountain that Lund would arrange the financing and would 
take the forklift in for maintenance, repairs, and service for the purchase. The forklift was 
removed for servicing and Rocky Mountain provided the financial information requested for the 
financing. The previously purchased bucket never left the premises. 
In mid January, 2006, Rocky Mountain was again contacted by Lund who requested the 
bucket, previously sold to Rocky Mountain in 2004, be added to the machine leasing agreement 
as an additional security deposit for the purchase. Rocky Mountain agreed to this change, as it 
would still allow them to convert the lease to a purchase without the need of upfront money. The 
inclusion of the bucket along with the lease credit would cover approximately 33% of the 
purchase price. Additionally, Lund indicated that Rocky Mountain could add a jib boom to the 
purchase. [A jib boom is a twelve foot long, metal piece of equipment weighing between 1600 
and 3000 pounds that is an additional accessory for the forklift.] Rocky Mountain agreed to add 
the jib boom to the purchase. 
Lund, through Mr. Webb, contacted and engaged a man by the name of Joe Leslie who 
began contacting Mr. Webb (Lund) and Rocky Mountain to arrange financing. Rocky Mountain 
believed Joe Leslie worked for Lund, when in actuality Mr. Leslie was actually a loan broker. 
Rocky Mountain was contacted by Joe Leslie, who collected additional financial information 
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from Rocky Mountain and reviewed the terms of the purchase agreement Rocky Mountain and 
Lund had entered into. Mr. Leslie reviewed financing options with Rocky Mountain and was 
again informed of the agreement that no upfront money would be required. 
In February 2006, Mr. Leslie had several conversations about the financing of the 
purchase agreement with Triad Leasing & Financial, Inc. (hereinafter Triad) Triad 
communicated all details concerning the lease to Mr. Leslie, and Mr. Leslie communicated all 
the details of the purchase agreement from Lund and Rocky Mountain to Triad. 
On March 15, 2006, Bennett Coffman, a Lund employee, met with Rocky Mountain and 
provided them with an Equipment Lease/purchase Contract. Mr. Coffman came with the contract 
at one of the busiest times of the day for Rocky Mountain. Mrs. Blittersdorf signed the contract 
and returned to work. Mr. Blittersdorfreviewed, and signed the bottom of the contract, indicating 
that delivery had not yet been completed. The forklift had been returned from being serviced by 
Lund. The bucket never left the premises. The jib .boom had never been delivered. Mr. 
Blittersdorf also specifically noted that there was no payment due until acceptance of delivery; 
that the contract indicated that there would be no payments required till April 20, 2006 assuming 
prior delivery of the jib boom; and additionally, Mr. Blittersdorfnoted that he had just signed the 
contract section stating that the delivery was not completed. 
After the contract had been signed, Mr. Coffman indicated that he needed to have Rocky 
Mountain provide him with a check for $5,600 to cover the security deposit. Mr. Blittersdorf 
explained that pursuant to his agreement with Lund and per the information provided to Mr. 
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Leslie for the financing, there was to be no money required upfront. He explained to Coffman 
that the lease credit of $22,314.31 and the bucket constituted the security deposit. Mr. 
Blittersdorf questioned Mr. Coffman regarding the security deposit, but Mr. Coffman indicated 
he was just asked to deliver it for signature.. Mr. Coffman made a phone call to their Mr. Leslie 
who Mr. Blittersdorfbelieved was an employee of Lund. Mr. Leslie informed Mr. Blittersdorf 
that the check was needed only as a paper trail and would be held, not cashed; This was an 
identical request Lund made when he leased the Forklift, and they had not cashed the check. 
Based on this representation and the prior history Mr. Blittersdorfprovided the check and 
specifically informed Mr. Coffman and Mr. Leslie that funds were not available in the account to 
cover the check. Mr. Blittersdorf was not suspicious of this request, as this arrangement was 
identical to the 2003 agreement he had with Lund, in that the check would not and was not 
cashed. 
Despite the failure of Lund to deliver the boom, and in contradiction of the assurances 
given to Rocky Mountain, and knowledge that there were no funds in the bank, Triad deposited 
the security check. This check was returned to Triad for insufficient funds. During February and 
March of 2006, Rocky Mountain inquired with Lund and Triad on several occasions requesting 
delivery of the jib boom. His calls were ignored. 
The contract required confirmation of delivery. Triad had received photographs of the 
Forklift on Blittersdorfs premises. The photo's showed the Forklift, and the bucket, but none 
contained a photo of a jib boom. Mr. Leslie sent an instruction to Triad that in order for Triad to 
7 
confirm delivery, they were to contact Mr. Leslie and not Rocky Mountain. This instruction was 
never known or agreed to by Rocky Mountain. On March 20, 2006, Triad contacted Mr. Leslie 
and requested Mr. Leslie have Mr. Blittersdorf call to confirm the delivery of all equipment and 
for a final acceptance. A short time after Triad contacted Mr. Leslie, Vickie Turner at Triad 
received a call from an individual claiming to be Mr. Blittersdorf. Ms. Turner had never before 
spoken with Mr. Blittersdorf and assumed that she was in fact speaking to him. Ms. Turner took 
no steps to authenticate who she was speaking to and assumed it was Mr. Blittersdorf. Based on 
this representation, Triad released its funds to Lund and Mr. Leslie. In truth, Mr. Blittersdorf 
denies that he ever made a call to confirm the delivery, as there was no actual delivery of the jib 
boom. Neither Lund nor Triad has provided any proof of delivery, trucking invoices, sales 
invoices, employee verification, or any other indicia of shipment or delivery. 
On April 11, 2006, nine days before the first scheduled payment date, Triad sent Rocky 
Mountain a letter terminating the loan contract for not making "the March 17, 2006." Record 
Excerpt pg. 19. Triad demanded payment in full of$92,701.70 for Rocky Mountain's alleged 
failure to make the March 17th 2006 payment. Triad stated that Rocky Mountain had breached 
the contract and that Triad intended to pursue all available remedies. On April 13, 2006, Rocky 
Mountain contacted Triad to discuss the demand letter, with specific attention to the fact that 
there was to be no upfront security deposit and that delivery of the equipment (jib boom) had not 
been completed. Rocky Mountain was informed by Triad that the delivery of the jib boom was 
not their problem because they were the financing company. Rocky Mountain was also informed 
that Lund had always intended to cash the security check. This was the first time Mr. Blittersdorf 
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was informed that Joe Leslie was not an employee of Triad. On this same day, Triad again spoke 
to Mr. Leslie and told him to have Llllld repossess the equipment. 
Despite notification by Rocky Molllltain to Triad, regarding Triad and Llllld's deviation 
from the purchase agreement relating to the security deposit, equipment delivery and payment 
schedule, Triad assigned the account to State Recovery for repossession of the forklift and the 
bucket. There was never a mention of the jib boom. This was the day before the contracted first 
payment due date. The notification to State Recovery requested that the forklift and lull bucket 
located at Rocky Molllltain be repossessed. The notification listed the forklift and bucket, but did 
not list the jib boom. State Recovery repossessed the forklift and Rocky Molllltain's bucket, and 
took it to their location for auction. The job boom was never mentioned again by either Llllld or 
Triad. 
Triad filed a complaint against Rocky Mountain for breach of contract. Rocky Mountain 
counterclaimed against Triad for breach of contract, fraud and violating the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act, in addition to a third-party complaint against Lund for breach of contract, fraud 
and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Lund filed a Motion for Summary 
Jndgment on the claims alleged by Rocky Molllltain. The District Court granted Lund's motion 
on November 7, 2007, stating that Llllld was not an agent for Triad. However, the claims against 
Lund as an individual entity remained pending. Rocky Molllltain filed a Motion to Reconsider 
the Motion for Summary Judgment on November 20, 2007. 
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Triad and Rocky Mountain appeared on November 26, 2007, for the bench trial. At the 
trial, the District Court questioned Lund's lack of appearance and indicated that Lund was only 
dismissed as an agent of Triad and not individually. The District Court held the bench trial 
without Lund, over the objection of Rocky Mountain, stating that the claims against Lund would 
be handled later. The bench trial lasted two days. Blittersdorfs were prejudiced in the 
presentation of their case due to the non-presence of Lund, and the application of the hearsay 
rule as to Lund's participation. 
On February 14, 2008, The District Court issued a decision on the bench trial. Following 
the District Court's decision, Rocky Mountain filed a Motion to Reconsider on each of the 
District Court's findings and a Motion for Mistrial. Each of the motions was denied by the 
District Court on July 30, 2008. In the order dated July 30, 2008, the District Court contradicted 
its earlier statement in court and ruled that all claims between Rocky Mountain and Lund were 
dismissed pursuant to the court's prior ruling. Rocky Mountain filed an appeal and amended 
appeal on these matters. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court error in finding the contract between Triad and Rocky 
Mountain clear and unambiguous? 
2. Did the District Court error in granting Lund's Motion for Summary Judgment in 
stating Lund was not an agent of Triad? 
3. Did the District Court commit an error in subsequently dismissing all of the claims 
against Lund as a separate entity based on its previous order granting Lund's Motion 
for Summary Judgment? 
4. Did the District Court error in determining the representations made to Rocky 
Mountain regarding the check and bucket, were future promises and not present facts, 
thereby granting summary judgment for Lund? 
5. Did the District Court error in finding that the jib boom had been delivered, thereby 
finding Rocky Mountain in breach of the contract? 
6. Did the District Court error in dismissing Rocky Mountain's claim for breach of 
contract against Triad? 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant hereby requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC.§ 12-120, 12-121, 
I.R.C.P. 54, Appellate Rules Rule 40 and all other applicable rules or statutes. 
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ARGUMENT 
Ambiguity and Clarity of the Triad Contract 
As a basis for several rulings, the District Court detennined the contract between Triad 
and Rocky Mountain to be clear and unambiguous. See November 6, 2007 Memorandum 
Decision and Order, Clerk's Record on Appeal pg. 79. The determination whether a contract is 
ambiguous presents a question oflaw over which the Court exercises free review. DeLancey v. 
DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32. In International Engineering Co., Inc. v. Daum 
Industries, Inc., 102 Idaho 363,630 P.2d 155, this Court stated, 
Where the language of a written agreement is clear and 
unambiguous, the trial court will give effect to the language 
employed according to its ordinary meaning, determination of its 
meaning and legal effect being a question of law. But when the 
terms of a written contract are ambiguous, its interpretation and 
meaning become a question of fact and extrinsic evidence may be 
considered by the trier of fact in an attempt to arrive at the true 
intent of the contracting parties. In so doing the trier of fact may 
consider the objective and purpose of the particular provision and 
may also scrutinize the circumstances surrounding formation of the 
contract. If a contract is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretations, it is ambiguous. Where interpretation of the parties 
agreement becomes a question of fact, this Court will not set aside 
the trial court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 365, 
157, internal citations omitted. 
In Roeder Mining, Inc. v. Robert E. Johnson et. al., 118 Idaho 96, 794 P .2d I I 52 the Idaho Court 
of Appeals stated, "If the contract contains absurdities or contradictions, the contract is deemed 
ambiguous and the court may look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent." Id. at 
97, I 153. 
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In this case, there are numerous inconsistencies and ambiguities in the contract that 
require additional infonnation to ascertain the meaning of the provisions and the intent of the 
parties. The first inconsistent issue on the contract is the Equipment Location section at the top 
of the contract. 
In this section, it would appear on the face of the contract that all of the equipment is 
located at the same address as the Lessee, and located with the Lessee at the time of signing the 
contract. Therefore, there would be no necessity for "Acceptance of Equipment Delivery." The 
bottom section of the contract is dedicated to obtaining an oral acceptance of delivery once it is 
completed, implying the equipment was not at the lessee's premises. Clearly all the equipment 
had not been delivered. This is a clear ambiguity of the contract, shows its inconsistency and 
requires additional information, outside the contract to discern whether it was delivered and if it 
was accepted. 
The second issue with the contract appears in the rental payment schedule portion of the 
contract. Under this section is a chart with various pieces of information with what appears to be 
headings. This section of the contract is reproduced below and is an excerpt of Record Excerpt 
pg. 13. 
U n Acee tanci: of E ui ment t',eliv 
Mont:bl Be innin · ril • 2006 
P11yment 
F't ue11cv 
One Time 
Monthl 
In this chart, there are four main sections, the Term (column!), Payment Tnfom1ation 
(columns 2 -5), Interim Rent (column 6), and Security Deposit (column 7). 
The first section (blue) indicates that the term of the agreement is to be 60 months. The 
third section (green) indicated that there was no interim rent as part of the contract. Neither of 
these sections is disputed. 
Section two (yellow) is a grouping of four columns that relate the infom1ation on 
payments. From these four columns, the clear language of the contract would indicate that there 
is a single, one time payment in the amount of$.OO due upon acceptance of the equipment 
delivery, and fifty-nine, monthly payments of$1,406.00 due monthly starting April 20, 2006. 
The final section is the Security Deposit that indicates $5,000.00. This section is not 
logically connected to the column to the left or any other columns. The horizontal line is not 
extended through the previous column. 
The langnage appears clear and unambignous when read in the groups described above. 
There appears to be a clear connection between the second, third, fourth and fifth columns as 
they relate to each other. Despite the apparently clear grouping of the columns, Triad and the 
District Court interpreted this section to mean there was a one-time payment of a $5,000.00 
security deposit due upon acceptance of equipment delivery. Reading the information in this 
manner requires extending the sections an ignoring the interim rent section. These ambiguities 
and interpretations clearly require additional, outside infonnation to determine this meaning. 
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The next contractual issue based on the face of the contract comes in paragraph 3( d). 
Record Excerpt pg. 13. This sections states that the Lessee has rights against the Vendor for 
certain problems. This is further outlined in paragraph 4(b) where it is stated that the Lessee must 
deal with the Vendor for various problems and again in paragraph 8 (Record Excerpt pg. 14) 
where problems with the delivery are stated to clearly be between the Lessee and the Vendor. 
Despite these sections, the contract states that there is no liability for payments until delivery of 
the equipment is completed. These sections contradict each other. If all of these sections are 
taken together, the contract cannot be completed and enforced until delivery of the equipment is 
completed but even ifthere is no delivery, it is not Triad's responsibility so there is no possible 
claim against them. This is a clear inconsistency and ambiguity in the contract. 
These issues clearly show that the contract between Triad and Rocky Mountain was not 
clear and unambiguous. The inconsistencies require outside information and corroboration to 
ascertain their meaning and reconcile the differences. By determining otherwise, the District 
Court connnitted error and refused to examine other evidence in this matter. Triad did not prove 
delivery of the jib boom (equipment). 
Summary Judgment for Lund 
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Summary judgment is appropriate only if the affidavits, depositions, admissions, and 
other evidence in the record demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. l.R.C.P. Rule 56(c), Hines v. 
Hines, 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20(1997). When considering a motion for summary judgment, 
the court "liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Brooks v. 
Logan, 130 Idaho 574,576,944 P.2d 709, 711 (1997). 
In granting summary judgment for Lund, the District committed error by ignoring issues 
of fact in the case, improperly excluding evidence and not applying the facts and record in a light 
most favorable to Rocky Mountain. The specific errors for each claim are addresses below. 
Lund as an Agent of Triad 
The basis for the claim of a breach of contract against Lund is founded on Lund's 
creation of a contract with Rocky Mountain directly and/or being an agent of Triad. In the 
Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, Third Party Claim, and Demand for 
Jury Trial, Record Excerpt pg. 52-68, Rocky Mountain claimed a breach of contract against 
Lund as an individual, and in concert with Triad. Id. pg 62. 
In considering a breach of contract the District Court relied upon paragraph 4(b) of the 
contract wherein Triad attempts to disclaim any connection to an individual or entity as an agent. 
Despite this disclaimer language, every action of Lund indicated an agency relationship. Mr. 
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Blittersdorf never met Joe Leslie or any Triad employee. Triad selected Joe Leslie, coordinated 
through Joe Leslie and Lund, and led Mr. Blittersdorfto believe Leslie was Lund's employee. 
The District Court found that a Lund employee delivered the agreement to Rocky Mountain for 
signing and collected the check for the security deposit. Memorandum Decision and Order pg. 3, 
Record Excerpt pg. 76. 
In addition to these roles in finalizing the contract between Blittersdorf and Triad, Triad 
depended upon to deliver the equipment, jib boom, and the contract. Id. The contract itself states 
that Rocky Mountain has rights against the vendor. Id. at 13-14 In addition, Triad cannot enforce 
the contract until Lund delivered all the equipment, including the jib boom. Id. The final box on 
the document states that there is no obligation to pay for the equipment on the lease until it has 
been delivered. Id. By these requirements based on the document itself, Lund is a party to the 
contract. 
Breach of Contract by Lund 
Even if Lund was not an agent for Triad, the District Court committed error in 
determining that there was no issue of material fact as to Rocky Mountain proving a claim of 
breach of contract against Lund. In the Amended Complaint, Counterclaim and Crossclaim, 
Rocky Mountain plead the breach of contract count both against Lund as an agent of Triad or in 
the alternative as a separate entity. Id. at 62. 
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The District Court never considered the breach of contract claim against Lund as a 
separate entity. The District Court's original ruling only addressed the issue of Lund as an agent 
of Triad. Court trial Day 1 Transcript pg. 44. The District Court stated that Lund was not a party 
to the contract between Rocky Mountain and Triad and that Lund could do nothing on its own to 
create an agency relationship. Memorandum Decision and Order pg. 3, Record Excerpt pg. I 06. 
In the complaint, Rocky Mountain alleged that Lund and Rocky Mountain entered into a 
purchase agreement before Tdad was involved. Excerpt Binder pg. 53-68. Lund approached 
Rocky Mountain about converting the lease to a purchase agreement. Id. Lund agreed to sell the 
equipment to Rocky Mountain and give them a credit for the amounts expended as part of the 
previous lease. Id. Rocky Mountain accepted this offer and the later offer to also include a jib 
boom in the purchase. Id. Rocky Mountain and Lund agreed to terms that the bucket would be 
the security deposit. Id. Lund agreed to find a financing company and to service the equipment 
before the sale. Id. Lund performed on this agreement by taking the equipment back and 
servicing it for the purchase. Id. Rocky Mountain performed on this agreement by providing 
financial information to process the purchase. 
At the court trial, the District Court indicated that it thought Lund would be there for trial 
on the claims it still had remaining. The District Court stated, 
THE COURT: Well, why do you think you're precluded from 
bringing that up with Lund? 
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MR. SWAFFORD: Well, I think that's a compulsory claim we 
have against Lund. Having it dismissed in this lawsuit, I'm fearful 
that it's prohibited from hereafter permanently. 
THE COURT: okay. But what makes you think that Lund has been 
dismissed from this lawsuit? 
MR. SWAFFORD: Well, your motion for summary judgment -
your order dismissed them from this lawsuit. If- that was my-
THE COURT: My order granted their motion for summary 
judgment. 
MR. SW AFFORD: Right. 
THE COURT: But their motion only went to whether they were 
parties to the Triad contract. Court Trial Day 1 Transcript pg. 44. 
After issuing its order and stating the above at the court trial, the District Court, in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated July 30, 2008 stated, "The Court has listened to the 
recording of the arguments on the first day of trial. The Court ... did not indicate that there were 
any claims remaining against Lund." Id at pg 4, Record Excerpt pg. 107. The Court further 
stated, "That motion and decision resolves every claim raised by the third-party complaint." Id. 
A review of the Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint filed by 
Rocky Mountain clearly shows that the breach of contract was made against Lund both as an 
agent of Triad and as an individual entity. Id. at 62. The District Court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order never considered the claim against Lund as an individual before dismissing the claim 
on July 30, 2008. Even if this Court finds the District Court did consider the claim against Lund 
as an individual entity, it is clear that there is a genuine issue of fact that a contract, albeit an oral 
contract, existed between Lund and Rocky Mountain and a claim that can be proven. 
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Once this contract is determined, there is also a genuine issue that Lund breached the 
agreement by not providing all the equipment and altering the terms of payment and deposit. 
There was a clear set of facts upon which Rocky Mountain could prevail against Lund on a 
breach of contract claim. As the District Court did not address this aspect of the claim, it 
committed error in dismissing the cause of action against Lund. 
Fraud by Lund 
In determining the issues of the fraud claim, the District Court's decision centered on the 
question on future promises or present facts. The issues under the fraud claim have been 
characterized by the court as promises of future events, and therefore not applicable to the fraud 
statute. (See Memorandum Decision and Order page 7, Record Excerpt pg. 80.) The statements 
by Lund constitute the actual status of the bucket and check at the time of the contract and not 
any promise of a future event. 
In this matter, for the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Lund admitted the 
statements that the bucket in this contract was a security deposit and the check would not be 
cashed but only a paper trail. Record Excerpt pg. 77, 80. These statements are not a promise of 
future events, but rather a current characterization of the bucket in question and assigning its 
status for the contract and the nature and purpose of the check. A paper trail is not a promise of 
future events, it is a factual, current status of a document, and a security deposit is a status. The 
check's characterization by Lund, along with the characterization of the bucket, induced Mr. 
Blittersdorf into signing the contract and writing the check. He was not relying on future 
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promises but instead the present statements of current facts for these items, confirmed by an 
identical prior agreement where the check was in fact held and not cashed 3 years prior. Court 
Trial Day 2 Transcript pg. 265. 
The District Court relied on the case law from First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. 
Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683. (1988). In that case, the defendant was told that his 
guaranty of corporate debt was a formality and that they bank would satisfy the debt from 
company assets before pursuing the guaranty, should a default happen. The Trial court and 
appellate court stated this was a future promise. 
stated, 
In Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC., 142 Idaho 671, 132 P.3d 428, this Court 
As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements 
promissory in nature that relate to future actions or upon the mere 
failure to perform a promise or an agreement to do something in 
the future. The allegedly false representation must concern past or 
existing material facts. 
We have recognized two exceptions to the general rule that fraud 
cannot be based upon the mere failure to perform a promise. One 
exception is if the speaker made the promise without any intent to 
keep it, but to induce action on the part of the promisee. The 
second exception is if the promise was accompanied by statements 
of existing fact which show the promisor's ability to perform the 
promise and those statements were false. Id. at 674, 431. 
Additionally, this Court stated, "Where the promise is made without any intent on the promisor's 
part to keep it, but to induce action on the part of the promisee, it is held to be fraud. Fraud may 
be predicated upon the nonperformance of a promise in certain cases where the promise is the 
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device to accomplish the fraud." Pocatello Security Trust Co. v. Henry, 35 Idaho 312,314,206 
P. 175,177. 
In this case, the statement to Rocky Mountain was not a promise of future performance, 
but rather stating the current and existing nature of both the bucket and the check. The bucket 
was a security deposit and the check a paper trail. These characterizations do not require any 
future performance or action. 
Even if the Court were to characterize the statements as promises of future performance, 
they are still fraudulent. Lund informed Rocky Mountain that the check would be held as it had 
been in the 2003 lease. Court Trial Day 2 Transcript pg. 265. This statement showed Rocky 
Mountain could rely on Lund and that Lund could keep the promise, because it had done so in 
the past. Additionally, Lund had no intention of keeping the promise as they were required to 
provide the check to Triad for negotiation. Pursuant to either analysis, the statement by Lund 
concerning the bucket and check were sufficient to support the claim of fraud. Additionally, this 
clearly raises an issue of fact that the District Court could not resolve as a matter of law in 
granting summary judgment. 
Triad Breach of Contract 
The District Court incorrectly determined that Rocky Mountain was in breach of the 
contract and incorrectly determined that Triad did not breach the contract by demanding 
payments before they were due. In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the 
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District Court found Rocky Mountain in breach of the contract for not paying the security 
deposit. Record Excerpt pg 91. Triad claimed that Rocky Mountain was in breach of the contract 
for not paying the March 17, 2008 security deposit. Id pg. 19. 
The District Court dismissed the claim of Rocky Mountain that there could be no breach 
as there was no delivery of the equipment as required by the contract. Id pg. 91. The District 
Court found that delivery of the equipment did not matter because paragraph 8 of the contract 
stated that Triad was not responsible for the delivery. Id. Based on the face of the contract and 
testimony presented, the District Court committed numerous errors in these findings. 
The contract states that payments are not due until acceptance of the delivery of the 
equipment. Under the section of Rental Payment Schedule, discussed above under the ambiguity 
of the contract section, at best, a one time payment of $5,000.00 is stated to be due "Upon 
Acceptance of Equipment Delivery." Id. pg. 13. As noted in the section above, the clear 
language of the contract would state that the one time payment upon acceptance of equipment 
delivery was $.00. 
Again on the bottom of the contract in the last boxed section, the document states there is 
no obligation to pay until acceptance of the delivery. Id. By signing this bottom section, it is 
clear that delivery of the equipment had not been completed at the time of signing the contract. 
The clear and unambiguous language of these sections is that at the date of signing the contract, 
the equipment was not delivered and accepted and that there were no payment requirements until 
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this acceptance of delivery was completed or some other unspecified time. The contract was not 
enforceable until the delivery was completed. 
Despite these sections of the contract, Triad found Rocky Mountain in breach of the 
contract as of the March 17, 2006 payment they claimed was due. Final Payment Notice, Id. pg. 
19. Even on the face of the contract, Rocky Mountain could not have been in breach of the 
contract on March 17, 2006 as at that time there was no payment due. The contract states that the 
acceptance of delivery did not occur until March 20, 2006. By claiming a breach in the contract 
from the March 17, 2006 payment, Triad breached the contract. (Note, Rocky Mountain insists 
the jib boom was never delivered.) 
The District Court also committed error in finding that the delivery of the equipment did 
not matter based on paragraph 8 of the contract. While Triad may not have been responsible for 
the delivery of the equipment, they cannot have an enforceable contract without the equipment 
being delivered. The District Court also committed error in finding the testimony of Vickie 
Turner sufficient to show delivery complete. Ms. Turner testified that she had no way to ensure 
that the person who called her and claimed to be Mr. Blittersdorf was in fact Mr. Blittersdorf. 
Court Trial Day 1 Transcript pg. 213. Additionally, Ms. Turner only stated that "I verify that 
they have received their 1997 Hi Reach Forklift." Id. at 202. Ms. Turner did not even confirm all 
of the equipment that should have been delivered. 
The question of delivery was refuted by Mr. Blittersdorf in his testimony (Court Trial 
Day 2 Transcript pg. 281 ), and that testimony is supported by the equipment verification that 
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shows no jib boom in the photo (Trial Exhibit A, Comi Trial Day 1 Transcript pg. 152-154) and 
the repossession report that shows no jib boom being repossessed (Court Trial Day 1 Transcript 
pg. 176-178). At trial, the representative of Triad, Mr. John Wakefield, even states that delivery 
was not completed. When asked about docmnents from Triad showing proof that the jib boom 
was delivered, Mr. Wakefield states none of the docmnents show it was delivered, "yet, most of 
it was." Transcript pg. 174. This statement shows that even the representative of Triad knew that 
only "most of' the equipment was delivered. The contract required that all of the equipment be 
delivered and not just most of it to have an enforceable contract. As such, the District Court 
committed error in relying solely on testimony from one witness that could not even authenticate 
the identity of the person on the phone who called her. Ms. Turner did not even dial a number 
associated with the Rocky Mountain. Id. 
Based on the findings by the District Court, if allowed to stand, Triad is able to have an 
employee sign the verification of oral acceptance without a sufficient showing from the party of 
the contract giving acceptance to the delivery to validate their contract. Additionally, it does not 
matter if the equipment was even delivered or not because paragraph 8 states that Triad is not 
responsible for delivery. In this ruling, the District Court stripped all meaning from the contract 
provisions requiring accepted delivery before the contract was in force. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the nmnerous errors of the District Court, Rocky Mountain was first denied the 
opportunity to have Lund in court to answer for the fraudulent representations it made to seduce 
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and extract this contract. In granting summary judgment, the District Court ignored all questions 
of fact and misapplied case law, allowing Lund to escape trial. Lund induced Rocky Mountain 
into signing the lease agreement by making the same promises Lund had made years before. The 
difference this time is that Lund had no intention of keeping those promises. 
Next, Rocky Mountain was denied the protection of the contract terms to not be 
responsible for a contract that was never completed. Delivery was never completed and all the 
District can rely upon to state otherwise is the simple testimony from an unverified phone caller 
while ignoring the mountain of evidence to the contrary, including testimony from an officer of 
Triad. 
The District Court also ignored the fact that Triad breached the contract by demanding a 
payment before any was due. Triad demanded a payment from Rocky Mountain at the signing of 
the contract. Even ignoring the clear language of the contract in favor of the interpretation 
alleged by Triad that a payment was due upon delivery, at the signing of the contract, delivery 
was not yet completed and no payment due. This breach of the contract was before any alleged 
breach by Rocky Mountain. 
Contracts were breached and fraud was committed, but not on the part of Rocky 
Mountain. They were never even given the opportunity to perform on this contract as the 
equipment was repossessed before all of it could be delivered or the first monthly payment was 
due. Two businesses conspired to get the equipment and money from Rocky Mountain and then 
each hide behind the other, and the District Court allowed them to do just that. 
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The appellant requests this court reverse the judgment issued by the District Court in 
favor of Triad; reverse the ruling on the motion for summary judgment in favor of Lund, 
including all attorney fees and costs awarded. 
Ifthls court does not reverse the ruling in favor of Triad, it is requested that any judgment 
be stayed until a judgment is issued in the matter against Lund, since it was a third party claim 
asking for judgment against Lund for any judgment issued in favor of Triad. 
The appellant requests attorney fees and costs. 
Respectfu!Jy submitted this 9th day of March, 2009 
Of Swafford Law Office, Chartered 
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